Several authors have suggested that a more parsimonious and conceptually elegant treatment of everyday mereological and topological reasoning can be obtained by adopting a spatial ontology in which regions, not points, are the primitive entities. This paper challenges this suggestion for mereotopological reasoning in 2-dimensional space. Our strategy is to de ne a mereotopological language together with a familiar, point-based interpretation. It is proposed that, to be practically useful, any alternative region-based spatial ontology must support the same sentences in our language as this familiar interpretation. This proposal has the merit of transforming a vague, open-ended question about ontologies for \practi-cal" mereotopological reasoning into a precise question in model theory. We show that (a version of) the familiar interpretation is countable and atomic, and therefore prime. We conclude that useful alternative ontologies of the plane are, if anything, less parsimonious than the one which they are supposed to replace.
The problem
One of the many achievements of coordinate geometry has been to provide a conceptually elegant and unifying account of the nature of geometrical entities. According to this account, the one primitive spatial entity is the point, and the one primitive geometrical property of points is coordinate position. All other geometrical entities|lines, curves, surfaces and bodies|are nothing but collections of points; and all properties and relations involving these entities may be de ned in terms of the relative positions of the points which make them up. The success and power of this reduction is so great that the identi cation of spatial regions with the sets of points they contain has come to seem virtually axiomatic.
Yet various authors have sought to reverse this order of rational reconstruction, treating regions as primary, and admitting points, if at all, as logical constructions out of them. The best known of these approaches is perhaps Tarski's 35] axiomatization of Euclidean geometry, taking spheres to be the primitive entities. But the policy of taking regions as primitive is most attractive when considering problems involving mereological (part-whole) and topological notions|that is, where no metric information is to hand. If regions are rst class entities and points are logical constructions based on them, then who knows what interesting new ways of considering spatial entities and relations there might be? Clarke 11] , 12], following an idea of Whitehead 39] , sought to reconstruct mereotopology in terms of a primitive relation of connection holding between regions. Following this work, Biacino and Gerla 5] have studied models of Clarke's theory. More recently, and partially as a response to debates concerning temporal reasoning and knowledge representation (for example, Allen 1] ), Clarke's mereotopology has received attention from several research groups in AI, working with the loosely de ned area of qualitative spatial reasoning, for example, Gotts, Gooday and Cohn 17], Asher and Vieu 2], and Borgo, Guarino, and Masolo 6] . For a treatment of region-based topology in a general setting, see Roeper 31] .
Motivations for these developments vary, and we do not intend to provide a comprehensive account of them here. However, one common recurring theme is the suspicion that the familiar, point-based, view of space generates a richer ontology than is needed for mereotopological reasoning in \practical" situations. For example, Euclidean space contains not only the sorts of regions we want to recognize for everyday purposes, but also strange, physically unrealizable regions of the kind that populate point-set topology textbooks. Such regions seem to be mere artifacts of the Euclidean model of space|useless for describing, and reasoning about, the world we inhabit. If, on the other hand, we regard regions as primitive entities, perhaps we can be more selective as to what regions we take to exist and what mereotopological properties we take them to have. Perhaps|so some researchers in mereotopology suggest|treating regions as primary opens up the prospect of simpler and more parsimonious spatial ontologies than the familiar model based on points in the real plane.
The present paper examines this suggestion for the special case of plane mereotopology. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions as to what practical mereotopological reasoning might involve, taking regions rather than points as primitive cannot lead to a more parsimonious spatial ontology. To get an idea of what \practical" mereotopological reasoning might involve, consider computer systems specialized for representing plane spatial data, such as Geographic Information Systems (GISs). Virtually all such systems represent regions of space by means of boundaries consisting of nitely many straight lines and straight-line segments. In e ect, then, all plane regions recognized by such systems are polygons. Experience has shown that such a spatial ontology, whatever its philosophical shortcomings, is certainly equal to the task of describing everyday planar spatial arrangements such as those found on maps and charts, since any arrangement of regions one is likely to encounter can be approximated by polygons with arbitrarily high accuracy.
Suppose, then, we take as our spatial ontology the set P of polygons in the plane. We discuss the formal construction of P later; for the present, all that matters is that all members of P are plane regions bounded by nitely many straight lines, as shown in gure 1a. (As explained below, we take these regions not to include their boundaries.) Note that we allow polygons to consist of more than one piece, to be unbounded, and to contain holes, as long as those holes have straight-line boundaries; however, polygons are not allowed to contain \cracks", as shown in gure 1b. In addition, we consider the empty set and the whole plane to be polygons.
It turns out that P forms a Boolean algebra. In this Boolean algebra, the product of two polygons is their intersection; the negation of a polygon is that part of the plane lying outside it and its boundary; and the sum of two polygons is the polygon formed by taking their union and`rubbing out' any internal boundaries that result. Figure 1c illustrates the sum-operation. Accordingly, our mereotopological language will be equipped with functions-symbols , ? and + to denote these operations, as well as the constants 0 and 1 to denote the empty set and the whole plane, respectively. Note that the formula x y = x states that x is a subset of y. Hence the Boolean functions can express various mereological properties and relations involving polygons.
In point-set topology, it is usual to de ne an open set as being connected if it is not the union of two disjoint, nonempty, open sets. Intuitively, connected sets are just that|they consist of one piece. Accordingly, our language will be equipped with a one-place predicate c(x) to express the property of being a connected polygon. (Incidentally, since we take polygons not to include their boundaries, the right-most polygon in gure 1a is not connected.) If x and y are disjoint, connected and non-empty, then it is possible to show that the formula c(x + y) is satis ed if and only if x and y share one or more proper straight line segments on their boundaries. In other words, the formula c(x+y)
can be used to express the relation of external contact along an edge. Hence, the predicate c(x), together with the Boolean functions, can express various topological properties and relations involving polygons.
Thus, we take our mereotopological language L to be a rst-order language with equality and non-logical constants +, , ?, 0, 1 and c(x). The set P of polygons will form the domain over which the variables of L range, and the interpretation of the non-logical constants of L given above de nes a model P on the domain P. The sentences Th(P) true in this model represent, as it were, the facts of mereotopology according to the the polygonal ontology employed in most computer systems for representing plane spatial data.
We propose to take Th(P) to be the facts of \practical" mereotopological reasoning. After all, the polygonal model P is relatively simple, admits no pathological regions, and yet is mereotopologically non-trivial and nds use in many practical applications without apparent loss of useful representational power. Moreover, it will turn out in section 6 that P can be considerably liberalized without changing the resulting theory. We further propose that an alternative spatial ontology for practical mereotopological reasoning is simply an alternative model of Th(P)|that is, a model A such that A P but A 6 ' P.
The domain A of A will form the set of regions of space and the relations and properties needed to interpret the terms in L will give this space its mereotopological structure.
Note that the domain P contains only polygonal regions, and not the points and lines of which they are made up. Thus, we employ a language which can talk, in the rst instance, only about regions, in keeping with the spirit of mereotopology. On the other hand, our model P is fundamentally Euclidean, in that polygons are objects in the Euclidean plane de ned in terms of the points they contain or the lines that bound them. Thus, P is, as it were, our familiar ontology|one constructed in the familiar way from points in the Euclidean plane. A general model of Th(P), by contrast, may have any sorts of objects in its domain, either primitive or constructed in some other way. The problem we face in the sequel is to identify such general models, and to determine whether any of them constitute a more elegant and parsimonious spatial ontology than P.
It may be objected that this strategy is too conservative. After all, who says that the facts of practical mereotopological reasoning|the facts that we would want any alternative spatial ontology to support|are the facts that are true of the polygonal data-structures employed in many computer systems? Perhaps we could nd a better theory of space by revising this \computer-mereotopology". To some extent, this criticism is justi ed: we have little to say in favour of the polygonal theory, except that it is familiar, easily formalized and seems to be widely and successfully used in a vast range of practical applications. (Proponents of other theories of mereotopological reasoning should be so lucky.) Nevertheless, our strategy does have the virtue of transforming a vague and open-ended question about ontologies for \practical" mereotopological reasoning into a precise, technical question in model theory. To be sure, we do not regard the solution of this problem to be the last word on the metaphysics of space; but at least we now have a de nite question to address.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3 outlines the construction of the polygonal ontology, section 4 establishes some preliminary topological features of this ontology and section 5 uses these results to prove the model theoretic results which form the core of the paper. Finally, section 6 generalizes these results beyond the polygonal case.
3 The polygonal models Our rst task in formalizing the polygonal ontology is to resolve the issue of whether regions include their boundary points. We adopt an approach, based on regular open sets, which has become reasonably standard in discussions of spatial description languages.
De nition 3.1 Let X be a topological space and x X. Then the set S fy Xj y open, y \ x = ;g is an open set in X called the pseudocomplement of X, written x 0 . We say that x X is regular if x = x 00 .
Note, for brevity, we use the term \regular" where most authors would use \regular open". We shall never have occasion to refer to regular closed sets.
The following well-known theorem underlies the importance of the regular sets to mereotopology. We state it here without proof. Theorem 3.1 Let X be a topological space. Then the set RO(X) of regular sets in X forms a Boolean algebra with top and bottom de ned by 1 = X and 0 = ;, and Boolean operations de ned by x y = x \ y, x + y = (x y) 00 and ?x = x 0 .
In fact, RO(X) is a complete Boolean algebra, and moreover, every complete Boolean algebra is isomorphic to RO(X) for some topological space X; however, we will not be concerned with these facts about regular sets. (See, e.g. Koppelberg 22 ], p. 26 and p. 60.) Accordingly, we shall sometimes use the term regular Boolean algebra of a topological space X to refer to RO(X). When dealing with the elements of such a Boolean algebra, we shall write x y, x + y, ?x and instead of x \ y, (x y) 00 and x 0 , respectively. Theorem 3.1 shows that the part-whole relationship, restricted to the regular sets, still obeys the axioms of a Boolean algebra, so that con ning our attention to such sets will result in a mathematically manageable theory. Actually, some mereotopologists think it important that the empty set not count as a region, and be eschewed from the domain of quanti cation of mereotopological theories. We see no reason for such a restriction, but readers who disagree can easily adapt the results below to ontologies from which the empty set is excluded.
If X is a topological space and y X, we denote interior of y ( Lemma 3.4 Let X be a topological space, M a Boolean subalgebra of RO(X) and a 1 ; : : : ; a n a partition in M. Let into two residual domains, which we shall call half-planes. It is easy to see that these sets are regular, with each being the pseudocomplement of the other. Hence, we can speak about the sums, products and complements of half-planes in RO(IR We denote the set of polygons by R, and will sometimes refer to it as the polygonal domain. Thus, the elements of R are simply polygons as introduced in the previous secion.
Of course, R is not the only well-behaved spatial domain we might choose. If a line is de ned by an equation ax + by + c = 0, where a, b and c are rational numbers, we call it a rational line; and if a half-plane is bounded by a rational line, we call it a rational half-plane. Now we de ne:
De nition 3.3 A rational basic polygon is the intersection of nitely many rational half-planes in IR 2 . A rational polygon is the sum, in RO(IR 2 ), of any nite set of rational basic polygons.
We denote the set of rational polygons by Q, and will sometimes refer to it as the rational polygonal domain. Thus, R, or perhaps, more modestly, Q, is the spatial ontology recognized by computer systems such as GISs|both domains provide a simple view of space from which any remotely pathological behaviour has been excluded. Clearly, R is uncountable, whereas Q is countable; so R and Q are di erent structures. Nevertheless, these ontologies are very similar, and share many basic properties. For brevity, we use the symbol P to denote either R or Q. Proof: We need only show that P is closed under the Boolean operations.
But this is obvious given the distribution laws for RO (IR 2 ) and the fact that the pseudo-complement of a half-plane is a half-plane.
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Now that we have de ned the polygonal domain (or, more precisely, domains) of quanti cation, P, we introduce our mereotopological language L. Let L be the rst-order language with signature hc(x); +; ; ?; 0; 1i, where c(x) is a 1-place predicate, + and are binary function symbols, ? is a unary function symbol, and 0 and 1 are individual constants. Informally, c(x) denotes the property of connectedness (in the usual topological sense), the function-symbols +, :
and ? denote the obvious operations in the Boolean algebra RO(IR We de ne the rational polygonal model Q exactly as for R but with R and R replaced throughout by Q and Q respectively. Again, in view of the similarities between R and Q, we write P to refer indeterminately to either. Thus, the domain of P is P. Anticipating a result of the next section, it turns out|unsurprisingly|that R and Q make the same sentences of L true. That is, the ontologies Q and R are indistinguishable for the mereotopological language L. Hence we may write Th(P) to denote Th(R) = Th(Q). Our main task in this paper is to nd alternative models of Th(P).
We nish this section on the familiar models for L with an example to show that the pains we took to de ne our domain of interpretation were not in vain.
Consider the following formula of L:
This formula asserts that, if the sum of three connected regions is connected, then the rst must be connected to at least one of the other two. It is true in the model P; but it would be false in a model whose domain extended to all regular sets of the plane. For consider the regions a 1 , a 2 and a 3 de ned by a 1 = f(x; y)j ? 1 < x < 0 ; ?1 ? x < y < 1 + xg a 2 = f(x; y)j0 < x < 1 ; ?1 ? x < y < sin(1=x)g a 3 = f(x; y)j0 < x < 1 ; sin(1=x) < y < 1 + xg ;
and depicted in gure 2. (Note: in this gure, the x-axis has been dilated.) It is not di cult to show that a 1 , a 2 and a 3 are regular, that a 1 +a 2 +a 3 is the interior of the large triangle in gure 2 and so is connected, but that neither a 1 + a 2 nor a 1 + a 3 is connected. This example demonstrates the importance of having a precise characterization of the regions our mereotopological language talks about. When looking for models elementarily equivalent to P as alternative ontologies for practical mereotopological reasoning, we are making some very speci c choices about the facts of mereotopology that we want to support.
Topological analysis
Our next step is to establish some basic topological properties of P. All the results in this section are routine and, in one form or another, well-known. The development is in some places perhaps more explicit than is necessary; however, this will prove useful when we generalize our results in section 6. The most important results for our purposes are theorem 4.2 and lemmas 4.9 and 4.10; the rest are ancillary. We begin with a lemma on which much of the subsequent analysis depends.
Lemma 4.1 Any element of P is the sum of nitely many connected elements of P.
Proof: Since half-planes are convex, basic polygons are convex, and so are certainly connected. Proof: If A = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g, let C be the set of all components of all non-zero products of the form a 1 : : : a n . By lemma 4.2, these components are elements of P, and form a connected partition such that every a i can be expressed as a sum of zero or more elements of C. 2
Furthermore, it should come as no surprise that we can picture connected partitions in P by thinking in terms of plane graphs.
De nition 4.1 A graph* G is a plane graph in the closed real plane having no nodes of degree 0, together with a (possibly empty) set of nodeless edges. These nodeless edges are all Jordan curves intersecting no other edge of G (nodeless or otherwise). A graph* is piecewise linear if all of its edges lie on nitely many straight lines; a graph* is rational piecewise linear if all of its edges lie on nitely many rational straight lines. A graph* is said to have an isthmus if there is one edge whose removal increases the number of its connected components. Figure 3 shows a piecewise linear graph* (where the page represents the whole closed plane) with two nodeless edges. This specimen also has no isthmuses and no nodes of degree 2. We note also that Euler's formula for a k-component graph, namely n ? e + f = k + 1, applies also to a k-component graph*, where nodeless edges do not count as components. Proceeding in the same way for a 2 ; : : : ; a n yields a graph* G = G n with faces a 1 ; : : : ; a n . That G has no isthmuses follows from the fact that each face of G is regular. G is a graph* with n faces forming a connected partition in P, and G has no isthmuses and no nodes of degree 2, then the size of G is bounded by f(n).
Proof: It is easy to show that, in a plane graph* with no isthmuses, any node of degree greater than 2 must lie on the boundary of at least 3 faces. Then, by lemma 4.5, the number of nodes in G is bounded by a function of n. ). (It is easy to nd counterexamples using constructions such as that illustrated in gure 2.) Moreover, the result also fails for partitions in RO(IR 3 ), even when we con ne ourselves to polyhedral objects. Proof: Let the components of ?a be t 1 ; : : : ; t m . Since t 1 ; : : : ; t m ; a 1 ; : : : ; a n is a connected partition, theorem 4.1 guarantees that we can nd a piecewise linear graph* G with no isthmuses having these elements as faces. Now maps a to b, hence the components of ?a to the components to ?b, hence G to a graph* G 0 with faces u 1 ; : : : ; u m ; f 1 ; : : : ; f n , say, where f 1 + : : : + f m = b. But then we can nd a a homeomorphism 0 of the closed plane onto itself which takes G 0 to a piecewise linear graph* G 00 without a ecting any points in ?b or its frontier. Hence, the faces of G 00 will be u 1 ; : : : ; u m ; b 1 ; : : : ; b n , say. Since G 00 clearly contains no isthmuses, theorem 4.1 guarantees that the faces of G 00 will be in R, so that = 0 is the required homeomorphism. 2 Lemma 4. De nition 4.2 Let a 1 ; : : : ; a n ; b 1 ; : : : ; b n be elements of P. We say that a 1 ; : : : ; a n and b 1 ; : : : ; b n are similarly situated, written a 1 ; : : : ; a n b 1 ; : : : ; b n , if there is a homeomorphism mapping the open plane on to itself such that (a i ) = b i for all i (1 i n). Now we can state the lemma guaranteeing homogeneity of P:
Lemma 4.9 Let a 1 ; : : : ; a n ; b 1 ; : : : ; b n ; a 2 P such that a 1 ; : : : ; a n b 1 ; : : : ; b n . Then there exists b 2 P such that a 1 ; : : : ; a n ; a b 1 ; : : : b n ; b. Proof: Assume rst that P is R. Let Lemma 4.10 Let a 1 ; : : : ; a n 2 Q and b 2 R. Then there exists a 2 Q such that a 1 ; : : : ; a n ; b a 1 ; : : : ; a n ; a.
The details are routine and we omit them.
Model-theoretic analysis
This section contains the main technical result of this paper, theorem 5.4. As we shall see, this theorem has negative consequences for the search for alternative spatial ontologies. Throughout this section, we use the notation a to denote an ordered n-tuple a 1 ; : : : ; a n . Let us begin by establishing the promised elementary equivalence of Q and R. First 
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Having set up our mereotopological language and its countable familiar interpretation Q, the proof that Q constitutes a`minimal' ontology proceeds quite simply using standard techniques from model theory. First, we must make more precise the claim that Q is minimal. The relevant concept here is that of a prime model:
De nition 5.1 A model A is said to be prime if, for any model B, A B implies that A can be elementarily embedded in B.
We show that Q is prime. It follows that any alternative spatial ontology making the same sentences of our mereotopological language true must contain a copy of Q, together with some additional elements which make no di erence to the formulae satis ed by the elements in that copy of Q.
The technique we use employs the notion of an atomic model: Our task, then, is to show that Q is atomic. The following results will also feature in the sequel. Hence, the familiar model constitutes a`minimal' ontology for practical mereotopology in the following sense:
Corollary 1 If A j = Th(P), then Q can be elementarily embedded in A.
The question of course arises as to whether the familiar model Q is strictly minimal among countable models of Th(P), in that there are countable models of Th(P) not isomorphic to Q. The answer is: yes and no. is satis ed in P by all and only those regions having exactly m components. Hence, the m (x) are all satis ed in P; so each can be extended to a type ? m (x) of Th(P). But the m (x) are also pairwise mutually exclusive in Th(P); so no two of them can be extended to the same type in Th(P). Hence, Th(P) has countably many types in x. 2
Thus, there exist countable models of Th(P) non-isomorphic to Q. By theorem 5.2, these models cannot be atomic, and so cannot be prime. Thus Q is, in a strong sense, strictly minimal.
However, it turns out that Th(P) satis es a weakened form of of !-categoricity. The next theorem shows that the only alternative models to P are those containing regions comprising, as we might put it, in nitely many pieces. De nition 6.1 Let L 0 be the language with signature h<; +; ; 0; 1i, interpreted in IR in the usual way (i.e. with + and denoting addition and multiplication).
A set A IR n is said to be de nable (without parameters) if there exists an L 0 -formula (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) such that A = fha 1 ; : : : ; a n i 2 IR n jIR j = a 1 ; : : : ; a n ]g:
We extend the use of this term in the obvious way: a point a 2 IR n is It follows of course that Th(T) = Th(P), so that the liberalization of the ontology arising from allowing regions to be described by any formula of L 0 makes no di erence to the set of truths expressible in L. We note in passing that the real polygonal domain R is not a subset of T, since R is uncountable. A corresponding liberalization of R would involve the use of parameters from IR in the de ning formulae. We also note that the results of this section might possibly be generalized to apply to regular de nable sets in two dimensions over any real closed eld. However, it is unclear that such generalizations would have any signi cance for our current concerns. The remainder of this section is devoted to proving theorem 6.2. To see where the di culties lie, recall our treatment of the polygonal case. Since basic polygons are convex, it was trivial to show that every element of P is the sum of nitely many connected elements of P, and hence that any component of an element of P is an element of P. But it is not immediately obvious that corresponding facts apply to T; and that is what we must show.
Once we have done this, the development parallels that of the polygonal case.
The following result is well-known (see, e.g., Hodges 20] 2
The development now parallels that of the polygonal case. Proof: Suppose that a 1 ; : : : ; a n form a connected partition in T. Take . Conversely, suppose that G is a nite de nable graph*. For each edge of G , lying on the arc ( 1 (t); 2 (t)), say, the set of reals t corresponding to local maxima and minima of 1 (t) (including endpoints) is de nable and therefore nite by theorem 6.3. Similarly, the set of intervals over which the function 1 (t) is constant is nite. Now add to G by drawing vertical lines at all these (obviously de nable) values of 1 (t), for each arc in G. The result must be a nite de nable graph* G each face of which is a 2-cell. If G has no isthmuses, then each face f of G is regular, and is in fact the smallest regular set containing all the faces of G (i.e. 2-cells) into which it is divided. Hence f is the sum of these 2-cells, so f 2 T. The proof proceeds, given lemma 6.4, as for theorem 4.2 and the preceeding lemmas.
Finally, we come to the homogeneity results. The critical observation here is lemma 6.4. Using this lemma, is it standard to show that, given any nite graph* G, we can nd a homeomorphism of the open plane onto itself taking G to a de nable graph*, while xing (setwise) all the de nable faces of G. The following lemmas can then be proved as for the polygonal case (with minor changes).
of spatial relations between representational tokens in the plane. Another more practical area in which ontological issues about the plane are raised is in the construction of computational spatial representations for robots, and in Geographical Information Systems (Davis 13], Vieu 37] ). As we have mentioned, GISs use planar polygonal regions to represent geographic objects. In mobile robotics too, it is common to represent a robot's information about its environment as a planar arrangement of places together with their connection relations (Davis 14 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the possibility of alternative spatial ontologies for \practical" mereotopological reasoning. In order to constrain the problem, we insisted that any such ontology provide a model elementarily equivalent to the`familiar' polygonal model P. Our motivation for taking P as our point of departure was that many computer packages designed to manipulate spatial data, such as GISs, restrict themselves to piecewise linear objects, without any apparent loss of useful representational power.
We identi ed rational and real`versions' of P, namely Q and R, with the former being countable. The main technical results of this paper state that, although Q is not the only countable countable model of Th(P), it is, in the sense of elementary embedding, the minimal such model. Thus, the countable alternatives to Q all contain a copy of Q|the`familiar' regions, plus somè non-familiar' regions which make no di erence to any properties of the familiar regions expressible in L. Thus, in a strong sense, they are less parsimonious.
Moreover, we found a simple condition on models of Th(P) which determines Q up to isomorphism, and provides a useful characterization of the other models of Th(P). Finally, we showed how P could be considerably liberalized without a ecting the truths expressible in L. Apparently, revisions to our ontology of the plane which do not violate the facts of polygonal mereotopology|to the extent they exist at all|must be less parsimonious than the one we started with.
